Abstract Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are physical objects that are unique, practically unclonable and that behave like a random function when subjected to a challenge. Their use has been proposed for authentication tokens and anti-counterfeiting. A Controlled PUF (CPUF) consists of a PUF and a control layer that restricts a user's access to the PUF input and output. CPUFs can be used for secure key storage, authentication, certified execution of programs, and certified measurements. In this paper we modify a number of protocols involving CPUFs in order to improve their security. Our modifications mainly consist of encryption of a larger portion of the message traffic, and additional restrictions on the CPUF accessibility which prevents some denial of service attacks. We simplify the description of CPUF protocols by using flowchart notation. Furthermore we explicitly show how the helper data for the PUFs is handled.
object. Applying a challenge and measuring the response can be done efficiently. The number of challenge-response pairs is very large. (2) The object is hard to clone physically, even by the original manufacturer. (3) It is hard to model mathematically.
Some physical systems are referred to as PUFs even though they do not satisfy all these properties. Controlled PUFs can be realized from physical structures with less stringent properties.
A good example of PUFs are the Optical PUFs introduced in [12] . These consist of a transparent material containing scattering particles at random locations. When laser light is shone onto it, coherent multiple scattering occurs. An image made of the reflected or transmitted light shows a so-called speckle pattern, a highly irregular pattern of bright and dark spots. The pattern is highly sensitive both to the locations of the scattering particles and to the properties of the incoming laser light, such as wavelength, angle of incidence and focal distance. The angle of incidence, for instance, can be used as a 'challenge' to the PUF. The resulting speckle pattern has a large entropy [10, 17] and can be seen as the 'response' to the challenge.
Authentication using bare PUFs
Originally the use of PUFs was envisaged for authentication in the following manner.
An Optical PUF supports a very large number of such challenge-response pairs (CRPs). Furthermore, knowledge of a large set of CRPs gives only negligible information about the response to a new challenge [16] . In [12] it was proposed to use PUFs as remote authentication tokens. PUFs are randomly manufactured by the verifier, Alice. The following procedure is followed independently for each PUF.
-Intheenrollment phase, Alice generates a number of random challenges. She measures the response for each challenge and stores the set of CRPs for that PUF in a database. The PUF is then handed over to a user, Bob. Alice couples users to PUF identifiers in her database. -In the verification phase, Bob wishes to prove to Alice that he possesses a specific PUF. He sends the PUF identifier to Alice. Alice looks up the CRP list for this specific PUF in the database. From the list she randomly selects a CRP. She sends the challenge part of the CRP to Bob. He applies the challenge to the PUF and measures the response. He sends the response to Alice. She compares Bob's response to the response in her database. If these match, then Alice is convinced of the PUF's authenticity. Whatever the outcome, the used CRP is removed from the list.
Alternatively, Bob does not send the response in the clear to Alice. Instead, the response is used to derive a shared secret between Alice and Bob, which they then use for an authentication protocol. 1 Optionally, a session key is generated from the shared secret as well.
The security of the PUF as an authentication token as described above completely depends on the unclonability of the PUF and the unpredictability of its responses.
Dealing with measurement noise
Apart from Optical PUFs many other types of PUF technology have been described in the literature, such as reflection of laser light from paper fibers [1] , randomized dielectrics in protective chip coatings [14] , radiofrequent responses from pieces of metal [2] or thin-film resonators [18] , delay times in chip components [6] and start-up values of SRAM cells [9] .
In this paper we will not be concerned with the physical aspects of PUFs, but merely assume that PUFs are available as a resource with all the right properties.
Whatever the physical realization of the PUF concept, there is a common problem that needs to be solved: noise in the response. The measurements are analog and hence inevitably noisy. A measurement result cannot be directly used in a cryptographic primitive such as a one-way hash or a block cipher. A single bit flip in the input (due to noise) would result in roughly 50% bit flips in the output. Hence, an errorcorrection step is needed so that Alice and Bob can exactly agree on the same bit string representation of a PUF response. (This is known as information reconciliation). However, the error correction is nontrivial. The usual attacker model for PUFs assumes that the redundancy data which is required for noise elimination is known to the attacker. Hence it is neces- Fig. 1 Fuzzy Extractor. The Gen function takes a measurement X as input, and generates helper data w and a near-uniform key S. The Rep function attempts to reproduce S from w and a noisy measurement X . It succeeds (S = S) if the noise is sufficiently weak sary to make sure that the redundancy data does not leak critical information about the common secret (the "key") derived from the response. The concept of a Fuzzy Extractor [3, 4] , also known as a helper data scheme [11] , was introduced as a primitive that achieves both information reconciliation and privacy amplification. The redundancy data (called helper data in such schemes) suffices to reproducibly reconstruct a string from noisy measurements (see Fig. 1 ), yet leaks only a negligible amount of information about the extracted key.
In this paper we will not be concerned with the exact details of fuzzy extractors. We will merely assume that proper helper data is present.
Controlled PUFs
The concept of a Controlled PUF (CPUF) was introduced in [5] . A CPUF is a combination of a PUF and a control layer in which the PUF is inseparably embedded. The control layer completely shields off the PUF inputs and outputs from the outside world. Any communication with the PUF has to occur through the control layer electronics. Any attempt to force the components apart will damage the PUF. A CPUF has considerably stronger security than a bare, unprotected PUF, since attackers cannot probe and query the PUF at will. In effect, the CPUF is a sort of trusted computing environment. The term "Physically Obfuscated Key" (POK) was coined by Gassend for this type of stored key. In contrast to the scenario sketched in Sect. 1.2, a POK key does not need to be discarded after use. A POK does not need all the PUF properties listed in Sect. 1.1. Instead, it only requires that the key obtained by the fuzzy extractor is shielded off from attackers. For a CPUF it is furthermore required that there are sufficiently many CRPs to accommodate all users, but by no means the "very large" number mentioned in Property 1.
In Gassend et al. [5, 7, 8] a way was presented to employ this trusted environment for the purpose of outsourcing computations. The idea is roughly as follows. (More details are given in Sect. 3.) First, CRPs of the PUF are handed to users in a secure way. Everybody (even people without CRPs) can remotely run programs on the CPUF control layer. There is a special Application Programming Interface (API) for accessing the PUF. With the help of this API a user can instruct the CPUF to generate a 'proof' of the correct execution of the outsourced program. This proof can be thought of as a MAC over the executed program and the program output, using the PUF response as the MAC key. If the user has a valid CRP, he can verify the MAC. (See Sect. 3.3.3.) This procedure is referred to as 'certified execution'. In the construction of [5] the proof is verifiable only by the user who sends the task to the CPUF. In [8] this was generalized to a proof ('E-proof') that can be verified by third parties as well.
The above scheme provides a way for users to outsource computations and be certain that their program was correctly executed, by the designated device, yielding the given result. No public key infrastructure is needed. Instead, the security is based on the secrecy of the CRPs. In addition to the proof generation, [5, 7, 8] also provide a number of protocols for CRP management, most notably bootstrapping (creation of the original CRPs) and renewal (allowing a user who possesses a CRP to obtain more CRPs).
For an overview of PUFs, CPUFs, and fuzzy extractors we refer to [15] .
Contributions in this paper
In this paper we propose a modification of the main CPUF security primitives. We work with the same assumptions about the PUF as in the original literature on CPUFs, and the same way of challenging the physical structure. 2 Our modifications of the primitives improve the overall security by putting additional restrictions on access to the CPUF and by encrypting more of the exchanged messages. We represent the protocols in a different way from [5, 7, 8] , namely in the form of flowcharts, which improves the comprehensibility of the protocols and of their security properties.
In [5, 7, 8] the protocols between users and a CPUF were represented as programs executed by the CPUF's control layer, using a specific security API. Hashes of these programs play an important role in the security primitives. In some cases, a function call involves a hash of a piece of the program containing the function call. We feel that such a formulation is needlessly complicated. Especially the self-referential nature of the program hashes can be confusing.
In our flowchart notation, each security primitive corresponds to a 'mode' of the CPUF, in which the control layer has a certain fixed input/output behaviour. A user can instruct a CPUF in which mode to operate, but cannot change the CPUF's sequence of actions in that mode. For each mode we present a flowchart. There are no hashes of control layer programs; the security clearly derives from the secrecy of the challenge-response pairs. Avoiding the program hashes allows for more efficient implementation.
In contrast to Gassend et al., we do not allow just anybody to outsource computations to the CPUF, but we first demand that a user establishes a secure channel with the control layer, based on a shared CRP. Any further communication has to take place through this channel. The advantage of this approach is twofold: (i) it provides more data confidentiality, e.g. the outsourced job and the results are not revealed to eavesdroppers, and (ii) it restricts the opportunities for attacks.
Finally, we explicitly show how the helper data is handled; this makes no essential difference with respect to the prior literature but completes the data flow overview.
The outline of this paper is as follows. We first explain the attacker model in Sect. 2 and summarize the construction of Gassend et al. in Sect. 3. Then we present our flowchart formulation in Sect. 4. We summarize our results in Sect. 5.
Attacker model
The manufacture and enrollment of CPUFs occurs in a secure environment. In particular, the bootstrapping (Sects. 3.3.1 and 4.2) is done by a trusted third party (TTP); this procedure yields CRPs. After obtaining a number of CRPs, the TTP disables bootstrapping, i.e. it becomes impossible for any attacker to run the bootstrapping process again, even if the attacker is in physical possession of the CPUF. We do not specify how the disabling is done.
The TTP hands over CRPs to users in a secure way, i.e. there is no eavesdropping. The CPUF is given to Bob (also in a secure way). The assumption is made that programs running on the control layer execute in a private and authentic way, i.e. their internal data is inaccessible to an attacker, and nobody can cause the program to execute incorrectly. Bob runs a remote computation service, offering trusted computing (based on the CPUF) to users. Bob allows users to communicate with his CPUF, but they have no physical access to it. The communication channel is untrusted. Attackers can eavesdrop and manipulate, delete and insert messages. Authentication between a user and the CPUF is based on a shared secret, namely the response to a challenge. Note that some PUF challenges will inevitably be sent in plaintext over the insecure channel. The security is derived from the unpredictability of the responses.
There are three kinds of attackers: (i) users who do not have a valid CRP, (ii) users who have at least one valid CRP, e.g. obtained from the TTP, and (iii) Bob. The following events constitute a successful attack: -A user, or Bob, learns a response that belongs to another user. -A user, or Bob, authenticates to the CPUF with a CRP that he does not know. -An attacker causes a legitimate user to accept a bogus outcome. -Bob, or a user other than the user who sends the job, learns the outcome of the computation.
API formulation of CPUF primitives
We first review the main CPUF primitives as described in [5, 7, 8] . In the original papers the security arguments for these primitives were informal; a more thorough proof of security in the attacker model of Sect. 2 was given in [13] using formal methods.
We do not discuss all the protocols, but restrict ourselves to Certified Execution, E-proofs and basic CRP handling (bootstrapping and renewal). We try to cover all the essentials. For missing details we refer to the original literature. We have kept the notation as close as possible to the original. Programs are written in C-like syntax. Variables are declared with 'my' as in Perl.
Hash blocks
The control layer maintains a stack containing program hash values. The most recent value pushed onto the stack is also referred to as PHashReg. The API has a command hashblock which manipulates the stack as follows.
The above code leads to the execution of 'lines of code' and computation of a hash over the concatenation of arg1 with all the lines of code within the {} brackets and arg2. When execution reaches the hashblock command, the CPUF computes this hash and pushes it onto the stack. When execution reaches the final ) brace, the top value of the stack is popped off and purged. Variables declared within a hash block are automatically cleared on exit from the hash block.
Note that the code within the hash block has access to PHashReg, i.e. a hash over itself. The self-referential nature of this construction was one of our motivations to look for a simplification.
The purpose of the hashing and of the rather peculiar structure, with arg1 and arg2 sandwiching the program code, is explained in Sect. 3.4.
PUF commands
The control layer accesses the PUF through the function 'PUF'.
-PUF(Chal) yields the PUF response to challenge Chal.
We list the API commands that deal with PUF access and the PUF responses. These commands are available to users.
-GetResponse. This instruction feeds PHashReg to the PUF as a challenge. GetResponse() = PUF(PHashReg). -GetSecret. Essentially, this instruction generates a hash of a PUF response. GetSecret(Chal) = Hash(PHashReg, PUF(Chal)).
3.3 API notation for CRP handling, certified execution and E-proofs
Bootstrapping
The CRP management of a CPUF is bootstrapped in a trusted environment. A trusted third party (TTP), e.g. the manufacturer or a CPUF issuer, obtains the first CRPs from the CPUF by running the following program,
Here 'PreChal' stands for 'pre-challenge'. The above code computes the hash of PreChal concatenated with the instruction between { }brackets (the hash that gets stored in PHashReg), then feeds that to the PUF and directly returns the PUF output. The TTP has to compute the actual PUF challenge PHashReg, and stores it along with the CPUF's output as a CRP.
As bootstrapping gives CRPs to someone who does not yet have a CRP, this function should be disallowed after the TTP has obtained its CRPs.
Renewal
Users who already have a CRP (OldChal, OldKey) can obtain more CRPs by running the 'renewal' protocol on the CPUF, as follows. As in the bootstrapping primitive, PreChal is a pre-challenge. It is chosen randomly by the user. The CPUF creates an encrypted channel back to the user through which it sends the new response. The actual new PUF challenge is a program hash that depends on both PreChal and OldChal. The user computes this hash; together with newR it forms the new CRP.
Certified execution
The method of creating an encrypted channel back to the user is used also for Certified Execution. A user possesses a CRP (Chal,Resp). Running the Certified Execution protocol for a job Prog with this CRP is done as follows, Here Runprog(Prog) stands for execution of Prog on the control layer. The user has all the ingredients to compute key himself, so he can verify the MAC: key = Hash(PHashReg,Resp). The register value PHashReg is known to the user, since he knows Prog, and the above listed code is publicly known.
E-proof generation
Next we list the steps for E-proof generation and verification as given in [8] . The parameter HCodeA stands for the hash over the arbitration program (see Sect. 3.3.5). The PUF challenge for deriving the MAC key is completely determined by Prog. Nobody but the CPUF has access to this MAC key.
E-proof verification ('arbitration')
A verifier who has Eproof, Prog and a valid CRP can check the correctness of Eproof. He first computes HProg = Hash(Prog), and then runs the following arbitration program on the CPUF through Certified Execution. Here HCodeE stands for the hash over the E-proof generation program (see Sect. 3.3.4).
Security purpose of the hash blocks
We briefly review the purpose of all the hashblock instructions, as explained in [5, 7, 8] .
In the Bootstrap procedure it is not strictly necessary to have a hashblock, since the TTP sees all secrets, but for simplicity the structure of the program is the same as in Renewal.
In Renew, the hashing of the challenge is of crucial importance. If Renew were to have a direct challenge Chal as its argument, then an attacker could exploit this: The attacker knows a CRP (Chal1, Resp1). He overhears another user's challenge Chal2, e.g. when that user is doing Certified Execution. The attacker would be able to run Renew with Chal2 as the new challenge (and Chal1 as the old) to obtain the response Resp2. This attack is prevented by the use of a Pre-challenge which has to be hashed in order to turn it into a challenge. Knowledge of Chal2 does not help the attacker to find PreChal; he has to compute a hash pre-image. The legitimate user, on the other hand, does know PreChal. Hence, the main purpose of the hashblock is to turn the pre-challenge into a challenge.
In CertifiedExecution and EProofGen, the function of the outer hashblock is to make sure that Prog is not tampered with. The key in CertifiedExecution and the secret in EProofGen are made to depend on Prog. The inner hashblock ensures that Prog does not have access to secrets such as the MAC key. The extra hashblock instruction pushes a new value into PHashReg, which prevents Prog from accessing the previous PHashReg value.
The purpose of the rather peculiar three-part hash construction, with arg1 and arg2 sandwiching the program code, allows EProofGen and EProofVer to have access to the same secret. This is achieved by letting these two primitives each contain a hash of the program code of the other primitive (HCodeE and HCodeA); in this way they are 'coupled' together, and no other program can get access to their shared secret.
Furthermore, it is our understanding that in each of the listed programs, the hash blocks are also meant to ensure that the PUF primitives are always run using the exact same lines of code. Users can run arbitrary code on the control layer, including the PUF commands PUF, GetResponse, and GetSecret, but any malicious modification to the programs in Sects. 3.3.2-3.3.5 leads to modified key values.
Remarks about the API formulation
We feel that the API construction is somewhat unsatisfactory from the point of view of implementation efficiency. Furthermore, the security of the protocols is not always transparent. (Note though that no security holes have ever been found).
1. In the work of [5, 7, 8] users are allowed to run any code on the control layer, including PUF commands. This is an open invitation for exploits. One of the purposes of the hash blocks is to thwart code modification attacks. We would like to depart from the philosophy that users should be allowed to execute PUF commands at will. Since the number of security primitives involving the PUF is very limited anyway, we suggest to 'freeze' the code that uses them, and allow user access only in the form of calls to Renew, CertifiedExecution, EProofGen and EProofVer, which now consist of fixed code in the control layer ROM. If this approach is taken, hashing of the control layer code becomes unnecessary. Note that the outsourced jobs 'Prog' and the pre-challenges must of course still be hashed, but this can be done without hash blocks. Hence, one can get rid of the hash blocks. One advantage of this approach is efficiency: the CPUF no longer has to compute hashes of incoming programs. 2. When a function call to GetResponse or GetSecret is placed inside a hash block, this leads to the highly selfreferential situation that an instruction operates on a hash over itself. While there is nothing wrong with this per se, it is confusing. The self-reference serves no security purpose other than fixing the code, as mentioned in Sect. 3.4. The confusion is avoided in the approach that we suggest above. 3. The Renewal protocol can be run even by users who do not possess a valid CRP. While this does not immediately pose a security risk (the attacker does not have OldKey, so the encrypted newR is inaccessible to him), it allows CRP-less attackers to run a sort of denial of service (DoS) attack: they may overwhelm the CPUF with requests for Renewal, even though they are not entitled to Renewal.
4. In the Renewal protocol, the PreChal is sent in the clear, and any eavesdropper can compute the actual challenge to the PUF. While this is not a security risk, the leakage of the new challenge could easily have been avoided by a slight change to the Renewal protocol: the pre-challenge could be sent to the CPUF over a secure channel, based on the shared secret OldKey. 5. E-proof generation and verification is 'asymmetric' in the sense that anybody can initiate E-proof generation, but a valid CRP is needed for E-proof verification. Again this opens up the possibility of a DoS attack by CRP-less attackers. They can overwhelm the CPUF with jobs to be run in EProofGen. 6. In Certified Execution and E-proof generation, the Prog and result are communicated in plaintext. While this does not necessarily have to be considered as a security risk, it would have been easy to build in some extra confidentiality: Again, it would have sufficed to set up a bidirectional secure channel based on a shared secret (the PUF response).
Protocol modifications and flowchart representation

Our improvements
In this section we introduce a more transparent representation for specifying user interaction with a Controlled PUF. The approach is based on Remark 1 in Sect. 3.5. We disallow arbitrary execution of PUF commands. Since the lines of code in the Bootstrapping, Renewal, Certified Execution and E-proof programs are then fixed anyway, we may as well replace these programs by fixed circuits. In this way we remove the self-referential nature of the GetResponse and GetSecret function calls, while at the same time improving efficiency by reducing the amount of hashing.
Each circuit (flowchart) corresponds to a 'mode' of the CPUF. A user can instruct a CPUF in which mode to operate, but cannot change the CPUF's sequence of actions in that mode.
We furthermore completely 'symmetrize' all the interactions between the CPUF and a user. We introduce a basic protocol underlying all the others: the setup of a (bidirectional) secure channel (SC) based on the shared knowledge of a CRP. We demand that any CPUF protocol has to run through a SC, i.e. a user needs a valid CRP in order to achieve any further communication with the CPUF whatsoever. This reduces the potency of DoS attacks and provides more confidentiality of challenges, outsourced jobs and results than the construction of Gassend et al. Hence our protocols do not have any of the drawbacks listed in Sect. 3.5.
Our construction immediately leads to a substantial simplification: Execution of any user program by the control Fig. 2 Bootstrapping mode. The control layer receives a pre-challenge P. The pre-challenge is hashed, yielding a challenge C, which is fed to the PUF. The PUF output is sent to the Gen function, which generates a secret key k and helper data w. The key k is hashed, yielding the response R. Finally, the control layer outputs the helper data w and the response R layer is automatically Certified Execution. Therefore we do not need a separate flowchart for Certified Execution.
As a final technicality, we explicitly include the handling of the PUF helper data in our flowcharts. While this does not add anything essential to the protocols, it completes the visualization of all the data flows and clearly indicates which PUF processing (Gen/Rep) occurs where.
In Sects. 4.2-4.6 we present our flowcharts for Bootstrapping, SC setup, CRP Renewal and E-proof generation and verification. The shaded area in each flowchart represents actions that occur within the control layer. A block arrow indicates data sent through a secure channel. (Fig. 2) The CRP management of a CPUF is bootstrapped in a trusted environment. A trusted party, e.g. the manufacturer or a CPUF issuer, obtains the first CRPs from the CPUF in bootstrapping mode. 3 These CRPs 4 {C, w, R} are distributed to authorized users.
Flowchart for bootstrapping
Bootstrapping is the only time at which the control layer ever reveals a PUF response in the clear to the outside world. After the trusted party has obtained a number of CRPs he permanently disables the bootstrapping mode.
4.3 Flowchart for secure channel setup (Fig. 3) A user who possesses a CRP for a specific CPUF can set up a secure channel with that CPUF over an insecure communi- 3 The 'hash1' function is included here for cosmetic reasons only, in order to have exactly the same flowchart as for our Renewal protocol. Its role will become apparent in Sect. 4.4. Note that hash1 and hash2 are different hash functions. The output of hash1 is a PUF challenge, while the output of hash2 is a key. The role of 'hash2' is to ensure that there is a secret known only to the control layer. This is important for the E-proofs (see Sects. 4.5 and 4.6). 4 The PUF challenge C and the helper data w together are considered as a challenge to the CPUF. Fig. 3 . The security is based on the fact that the response R is secret, even though C and w are revealed to attackers. The shared secret R allows the user and the CPUF to encrypt their communication, generate MACs etc. In Fig. 3 we have deliberately abstracted away the details of the SC setup by putting everything in a box called 'SC handling'. Many ways are known to establish a SC and then to properly communicate through it (with protection against replay attacks etc.), so we do not have to be specific here. (Fig. 4) Any user who already possesses a valid CRP for a certain CPUF can obtain additional CRPs for that CPUF using Renewal mode. Our flowchart for Renewal (Fig. 4) is very simple: it amounts to Bootstrapping executed through a Secure Channel. The user first establishes a SC with the CPUF. Then he initiates renewal mode. He sends a random pre-challenge P new and receives R new , w new . Finally he computes C new = hash1(P new ) and stores {C new , w new , R new }.
Flowchart for CRP renewal
Remark Similar to the Gassend et al. construction, manin-the-middle attacks are prevented by the fact that the hash1 function is present at Renewal, but not at SC setup. This prevents an attacker from abusing Renewal to obtain the response R for eavesdropped challenges (C, w). He would The SC-key in use is the hash of the secret key k; this k never leaves the CPUF. The user sends a program, which is executed and also hashed by the CPUF. The key k is used by the MakeProof function to certify the program hash, the result of the computation, and the SC setup parameters C, w have to invert hash1 to obtain the proper pre-challenge P = hash1 inv (C). (Fig. 5) We present our variant of E-proofs (verifiable by third parties). The protocol is run through a SC based on a CRP {C, w, R}. A user Alice outsources the execution of a program prog to the CPUF. She receives the result of the computation and the proof Eproof. She stores {C, w, prog, res, Eproof} for later use.
Flowchart for E-Proof generation
The MakeProof module in Fig. 5 can be e.g. a MAC using k as the key, or a keyed hash. The security is based on the fact that the 'internal' secret key k is known only to the CPUF. Hence nobody is able to forge the certificate, not even Alice, who has R = hash2(k), or even the trusted enrollment authority.
Remark The only program hash occurring in the E-proof generation is the hash over the to-be-executed job. There are no hashes over API instructions as in Gassend et al. (Fig. 6) When user Alice wants to convince a third party, Victor, that prog executed on the CPUF gave the result res, she hands over to Victor the data {C, w, prog, res, Eproof}. Victor establishes a SC with the CPUF using one of his own CRPs. Through this SC he runs the E-proof verification protocol. The protocol amounts to nothing more than checking the consistency between the E-proof, the 'certified' data {C, w, hash3(prog), res} and the key k. If the E-proof is a MAC as in the example above, then the consistency check is a simple MAC verification.
Flowchart for E-proof verification
Summary
We have given a modified version of the basic CPUF protocols for CRP management, certified execution and proof of execution. Our modifications further restrict access to the CPUF, and provide more confidentiality.
We have introduced flowchart notation to replace the API program formulation of Gassend et al. This gets rid of the selfreferential program hashes and clarifies the essential steps of the protocols. The security clearly derives from the secrecy of the challenge-response pairs. Furthermore, elimination of the program hashes reduces the amount of work done by the control layer.
In our flowchart notation, each security primitive corresponds to a 'mode' of the CPUF, in which the control layer has a certain fixed input/output behaviour. A user can instruct a CPUF in which mode to operate, but cannot change the CPUF's sequence of actions in that mode.
Finally, we have explicitly shown how the helper data is handled, completing the data flow overview.
